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SAM-01 /046 W
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R 151000Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8820
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 TAIPEI 1675

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, TW
SUBJECT: SPECULATIONS ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PART I, IF CHIANG CHING-KUO DIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK FELT BEHIND AN ABLE AND ALREADY ENTRENCHED SUCCESSOR TO POWER IN HIS SON, PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO (CCK), BUT THERE IS NO ONE CURRENTLY IN SIGHT WHO COULD FILL THE PERSONAL POWER VACUUM THAT WOULD BE CREATED SHOULD CCK DIE OR BE OTHERWISE INCAPACITATED. NOR, WE BELIEVE, IS THERE SUFFICIENT TIME TO ENTRENCH A SUCCESSOR SHOULD CCK DIE BEFORE 1978--A KEY YEAR ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRONT
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BECAUSE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE YUAN,

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AND CONTROL YUAN ELECTIONS ARE ALL SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT THAT TIME.

2. THEREFORE, SHOULD CCK DIE BEFORE THEN, THE REINS OF DAY-TO-DAY GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO BE SHARED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY BY A COLLEGIAL EXECUTIVE HAVING THE PUBLIC IMPRIMATUR OF THE KMT CENTRAL STANDING COMMITTEE AND COMPRISING A SIGNIFICANT GROUP OF ITS MEMBERSHIP, INCLUDING PRESIDENT YEN CHIA-KAN, VICE PREMIER HSU CHING-CHUNG (WHO WILL BE ACTING PREMIER), AND MOST OF THE CABINET TECHNOCRATS. THIS GROUP, WHILE HAVING NO REAL POWER ITSELF, COULD FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME CARRY ON THE ROUTINE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT AND GIVE THE APPEARANCE BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD OF CONTINUITY.

3. MEANWHILE, BELOW THE SURFACE THE BROKERING OF REAL POWER WILL BEGIN, WITH THE CENTRAL STANDING COMMITTEE AS THE FOCAL POINT OF ACTIVITY. WE WOULD EXPECT THIS BROKERING TO RESULT, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, IN THE DIFFUSION OF REAL POWER AMONG A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP, WHOSE MEMBERSHIP WOULD INCLUDE THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL STANDING COMMITTEE AND A SPRINKLING OF OTHERS, INCLUDING SOME FROM THE MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE DIVIDED AND UNWIELDY NATURE OF SUCH A BODY, A STRONG MAN WILL ALMOST INEVITABLY EMERGE. ONLY THEN WILL THERE BE A REAL SUCCESSOR TO CCK. END SUMMARY.

ASSUMPTIONS

4. IN PREPARING THIS ASSESSMENT WE HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS:

A. WHATEVER CHANG MAY TAKE PLACE IN THE US/ROC OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP BEFORE 1978, THE US WILL PRESERVE SUFFICIENT TIES WITH TAIWAN TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF INTERNAL POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION.

B. ALTHOUGH THE PRC WILL MAINTAIN ITS PUBLICLY DECLARED GOAL OF "LIBERATING TAIWAN," IT WILL NOT SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE ISLAND ECONOMICALLY OR MILITARILY.

C. THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION WILL NOT BECOME
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DRAMATICALLY WORSE AND NO MAJOR DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL OCCUR ON TAIWAN.

D. WHILE CCK MAY DECIDE TO GROOM ONE OR MORE POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS, HE WILL NOT PUBLICLY ATTEMPT TO DESIGNATE ANYONE AS HIS SUCCESSOR BEFORE 1978. (A DEATHBED ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD PROBABLY PROVE UNAVAILING BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR A DESIGNEE TO BECOME FIRMLY

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ENTRENCHED.)

THE DIFFUSION OF POWER

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (GROC) AT PRESENT HAS ONLY ONE SIGNIFICANT POWER CENTER--THE PREMIER; AND THERE IS NO ONE WHO COULD IMMEDIATELY FILL THE PERSONAL POWER VACUUM RESULTING FROM HIS DEATH OR INCAPACITATION. NOR ARE THERE OBVIOUS AND IDENTIFIABLE FACTIONS AROUND HIM OF WHICH ANY ONE COULD TAKE POWER OR WHICH COULD UNITE SO THAT A GIVEN FACTIONAL LEADER WOULD BE ABLE TO EXERCISE CONTROLLING POWER INITIALLY. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE QUESTION TO BE ASKED IS NOT WHO WILL STEP IN TO FILL THE POWER VACUUM BUT AMONG WHICH GROUP OR GROUPS WILL POWER BE DIFFUSED.

6. IN ASSESSING THIS QUESTION WE MUST LOOK BOTH AT THOSE WHO WILL AT LEAST INITIALLY PUBLICLY APPEAR TO HOLD POWER AND TO THOSE AMONG WHOM REAL POWER WILL INITIALLY BUT LESS VISIBLY BE BROKERED. TURNING FIRST TO THOSE WHO WILL APPEAR TO HOLD POWER, WE WOULD EXPECT TWO SEPARATE BUT OVERLAPPING GROUPS TO STEP INTO THE PUBLIC LIMELIGHT IMMEDATELY FOLLOWING CCK'S DEMISE. FIRST, IN RECOGNITION OF THE URGENT NEED TO PROVIDE THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINUITY AND STABILITY, PRESIDENT YEN CHIA-KAN, TE NEW ACTING PREMIER (PRESNT VICE PREMIER) HSU CHING-CHUNG (1776/1987/6988), AND THE CABINET WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL REINS OF GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME THE KMT CENTRAL STANDING COMMITTEE (CSC) WILL PROMINENTLY EMERGE BOTH TO GIVE ITS QUASI-OFFICIAL IMPRIMATUR TO THE EXISTING COLLEGIAL EXECUTIVE AND TO MAKE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CCK'S FUNERAL, JUST AS IT DID WHEN THE LATE PRESIDENT CHIANG DIED.

7. UNDER THE ROC CONSTITUTION, A NOMINATION FOR PREMIER MUST

BE SUBMITTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN FOR CONSENT WITHIN 40 DAYS AFTER THAT OFFICE FALLS VACANT. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT PRESIDENT YEN, AFTER SEEKING THE ADVICE OF THE CABINET AND CSC, WILL OPT FOR AN EXPERIENCED BUT POLITICALLY COLORLESS NOMINEE SUCH AS EDUCATION MINISTER CHIANG YEN-SHIH (5592/1750/1102), WHO WOULD ACT PRIMARILY AS A CARETAKER. BUT WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT, DURING THE DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE NOMINATION OF THE NEW PREMIER,

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FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
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INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY MANILA
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A BID FOR LEADERSHIP MAY BE MADE BY POTENTIAL POWER-WIELDERS (SOME OF WHOM ARE MENTIONED ELSEWHERE IN THIS MESSAGE). HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SUCH A BID WOULD SUCCESSFUL SO SHORTLY AFTER THE PREMIER'S DEATH. WHILE IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT ACTING PREMIER HSU MIGHT BE APPOINTED PREMIER BY DEFAULT DUE TO THE INABILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ANY OTHER CANDIDATE, WE BELIEVE THIS IS VERY UNLIKELY PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE HE IS TAIWANESE.

8. REGARDLESS OF WHO IS SELECTED AS PREMIER, FOR A PERIOD OF TIME THE COLLEGIAL EXECUTIVE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FUNCTION ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS. BUT WITHOUT THE LEADERSHIP PRESENTLY EXERCISED BY CCK (AND ASSUMING THAT ANY EARLY BID FOR TAKING POWER THROUGH THE PREMIERSHIP IS UNSUCCESSFUL), IT WOULD BE
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UNABLE ITSELF TO MAKE MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS SINCE THE ONLY

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PRINCIPAL LOCUS OF POWER AND DECISION-MAKING FOR THE PRESENT EXECUTIVE AS A GROUP IS CCK HIMSELF.

9. THEREFORE, IN ASSESSING THE QUESTION OF AMONG WHICH GROUPS REAL POWER WILL BE DIFFUSED AFTER CCK'S DEMISE OR INCAPACITATION, WE MUST LOOK BENEATH THE SURFACE TO THOSE GROUPS THAT MAY HAVE SOME ACTUAL CLAIM (OTHER THAN ASSOCIATION WITH THE PREMIER) TO A POWER BASE. THE PREMIER'S PRESENT STATURE AS THE SINGLE CENTER OF POWER HAS TENDED TO OBSCURE THE IDENTITY OF OTHER POTENTIAL POWER BASES AND TO MAKE DIFFICULT ANY CLEAR READING OF THEIR COMPOSITION AND POLITICAL INCLINATIONS. NONETHELESS, BASED ON THE LIMITED AND SOMEWHAT SKEWED IMPRESSIONS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT POWER WILL PROBABLY BE DIFFUSED AMONG THE KMT (INCLUDING PARTY BUREAUCRATS, THE OLD GUARD, AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT TECHNOCRATS WHO ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE PARTY) AND THE MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS.

10. OF THE GROUPS WITHIN THE KMT AND ITS CSC, THE OLD GUARD, WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE LED BY KU CHENG-KANG (6253/2973/4854), IS THE MOST CONSERVATIVE; AND THE SENIOR GOVERNMENT TECHNOCRATS, WHO WILL PROBABLY BE LED BY CHIANG YEN-SHIH OR LI KUO-TING (2621/0948/7844), ARE THE MORE PRAGMATIC. THE PARTY BUREAUCRATS, MOST OF WHOM ARE CCK-MEN AND WHO WILL PROBABLY BE LED BY LI HUAN (2621/3562), MAY WELL BE THE MOST FLEXIBLE AND COULD ACT AS A MODERATING FORCE. THE LAST GROUP PROBABLY ALSO HAS THE WIDEST FOLLOWING ASLAND-WIDE AMONG PROVINCIAL POLITICIANS AND OFFICIALS, BUT THEY ARE NOT REPRESENTED DIRECTLY ON THE CSC.

11. THE CSC WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE THE FOCAL POINT FOR THE BROKERING OF POWER, AT LEAST INITIALLY, AND WILL PROBABLY SEEK TO ASSERT ITSELF AS, IN EFFECT, THE POLICY EXECUTIVE OF GOVERNMENT. AS THE HIGHEST ORGAN OF THE QUASI-OFFICIAL NATIONAL PARTY, ITS POTENTIAL FOR WIELDING POWER IS FORMIDABLE. IN COMPOSITION, IT REFLECTS THE GROUPINGS WITHIN THE KMT DESCRIBED ABOVE AND INCLUDES SOME MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY.

12. THE CSC, HOWEVER, DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY DIRECT REPRESENTATION OF THE SECURITY SERVICES (MINISTER OF JUSTICE WANG JEN-

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YUAN, 3769/0117/6678, (WOULD BARELY QUALIFY). MOREOVER, MILITARY REPRESENTATION IS LIMITED (LAI MING-TANG, 6351/0682/3282, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND KAO KUEI-YUAN, 7559/7608/ (MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE) AND MAY NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT POTENTIAL POWER BASES IN THE MILITARY, SUCH AS GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT (GPWD) DIRECTOR WANG SHENG (3769/2573) AND THE VARIOUS COMMANDERS IN CHIEF. BECAUSE THE MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS HAS THE ONLY MEANS OF

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DEALING QUICKLY AND FORCEFULLY WITH PROBLEMS OF CONTROL, THEIR POTENTIAL ROLE IN ANY SITUATION WHERE POWER IS FLUID CANNOT BE IGNORED. THIS AND THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS WOULD ARGUE FOR THEIR ABILITY TO OBTAIN A LARGER VOICE IN THE POWER STRUCTURE THAN THEIR CURRRENT REPRESENTATION ON THE CSC WOULD JUSTIFY.

13. THUS, WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE IN THE INITIAL REAPPORTIONMENT OF POWER IS A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP WHOSE NUCLEUS WILL BE THE CSC BUT WHICH WILL INCLUDE OTHERS FROM THE MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS, AS WELL AS A FEW SENIOR ADVISERS SUCH AS CHANG CHUN (1728/5028) AND, BECAUSE OF HIS BROAD CONNECTIONS IN THE KMT, LI HUAN (2651/3562). THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY WILL BR REPRESENTED INDIRECTLY THORUGH ITS CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH SOME MEMBERS OF THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP. TAIWANESE (ONLY THREE OF WHOM ARE MEMBERS OF THE CSC AND NONE OF WHOM IS A POTENTIAL SOLO POWERWIELDER IN THE KMT, MILITARY OR SECURITY APPARATUS) WILL HAVE EXTREMELY LIMITED REPRESENTATION IN THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP. THERE ARE NO NEW TAIWANESE LEADERS WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND WHO COULD CLAIM TO REPRESENT THE TAIWANESE MAJORITY. THE OLDER TAIWANESE FIGURES AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACTIVE ON THE POLITICAL SCENE AS "KMT" TAIANESE FO A NUMBER OF YEARS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO PLAY A KEY ROLE.

INTERACTION WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

14. THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP WILL INITIALLY SEEK TO ACT ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS AND TO EMPHASIZE CONTINUITY AND STABILITY IN BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY. WHILE THERE MAY BE SOME PANIC-BUTTON FLIGHT OF CAPITAL AND PEOPLE THIS CAN BE PREVENTED IF THE GROC WISHES TO TAKE STRONG ACTION; AND

AT THE TIME OFCCK'S DEATH, UNDER THE ASSUMPTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE WE WOULD EXPECT THE SITUATION TO STBILIZE SOON AFTER HIS PASSING.

15. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE WIDELY VARYING VIEWS AND BACKGROUNDS REPRESENTED IN THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP, AS SOON AS IT IS FACED WITH CRITICAL POLICY DECISIONS, AN UNRAVELLING PROCESS WITH POTENTIALLY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IS LIKELY TO BEGIN. OBVIOUS CRITICAL PROBLEM AREAS ARE DOMESTIC SECURITY CONTROLS, BUDGETARY PRIORITIES, AND FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY RELATIONS WITH THE US.

16. BECAUSE THE VIEWS AND STATURE OF MANY OF THOSE IN THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP CANNOT BE ACCURATELY ASSESSED OWING TO THEIR OBFUSCATION BY THE OVERWHELMING ASCENDANCY OF CCK, IT IS

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IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT EXACTLY HOW THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP WILL
LINE UP AND WHERE THE BALCANCE OF POWER WILL LIE ON ANY GIVEN

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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ISSUE. MOREOVER, SOME CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE
CSC ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR. NONETHELESS,
SOME GENERAL PREDICTIONS CAN BE MADE BASED ON THE INFORMATION
PRESENTLY AVAILABLE.

DOMESTIC SECURITY CONTROLS

17 THE KMT OLD GUARD IN THE CSC, AND THE MILITARY AND SECURITY
APPARATUS, ARE LIKELY TO VIEW WITH FAVOR INCREASED CONTROLS ON
DISSIDENT ELEMENTS O THE POPULATION, ESPECIALLY TAIWANESE.
HOWEVER, THEIR VIEWS WILL BE TEMPERED BY THE NECESSITY OF
MAINTAINING THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINUITY AND BY THE VIEWS OF

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THE YOUNGER AND MORE MODERATE PARTY BUREAUCRATS, THE
TECHNOCRATS, AND THE TAIWANESE IN THE CSC. AS A RESULT, WE
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WOULD EXPECT THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP TO INCREASE TO A
DEGREE CONTROLS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. AT
THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE POLICY OF
"TAIWANIZATION" WILL CONTINUE, ALBEIT AT A MUCH SLOWER PACE
THAN UNDER CCK.

18. ALTHOUGH TAIWANESE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY VIEW THIS ARRANGEMENT
WITH DISAPPOINTMENT AND SOME DISGRUNTLEMENT, THE SITUATION CAN
REMAIN STABLE UNLESS THEY SEEK ACTIVE MEANS TO EXPRESS THEIR
DISPLEASURE. SHOULD THEY DO SO, A SEVERE CLAMPDOWN, IS LIKELY
TO OCCUR, AND "TAIWANIZATION" WILL GRIND TO A HALT. WHILE THE
RESULTING SITUATION COULD BE MANAGEABLE, IT WOULD RESULT IN
A DEGREE OF TENSION BETWEEN THE MAINLANDER AND TAIWANESE
COMMUNITIES UNKNOWN FOR MANY YEARS.

BUDGETARY PRIORITIES

19. ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS THAT THE COLLECTIVE
LEADERSHIP WILL ENCOUNTER IS THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT VERSUS MILITARY BUDGETARY PRIORITIES. WE
WOULD EXPECT THE LINEUP ON THIS QUESTION TO BE SIMILAR TO
THAT ON THE QUESTION OF DOMESTIC CONTROLS, BUT WITH THE OLD
GUARD, MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS HAVING THE DEFINITE
EDGE. THIS COULD RESULT IN THE DEROGATION OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PLANS WHICH IN TIME COULD IMPINGE ON TAIWAN'S CONTINUED
VIABILITY. EVEN SOONER, LESS ADVANTAGED GROUPS IN TAIWAN'S
SOCIETY MIGHT BEGIN TO FEEL LESS SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE
GOVERNMENT THAN TODAY.

FOREIGN POLICY

10. PARTICULARLY IN AREAS OF FOREIGN POLICY, EMPHASIS WILL BE
ON CONTINUITY. ON MOST FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES WE WOULD
EXPECT THE FOREIGN POLICY SPECIALISTS AND THE TECHMOCRATS
SUPPORTED BY THE PARTY BUREAUCRATS, TO BE MOST PERSUASIVE AND,
AS A RESULT, WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY SUDDEN CHANGES. IN PARTICULAR,
WE WOULD EXPECT THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP TO SEEK FURTHER
EXPANSION OF UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES NOT RECOGNIZING
THE ROC AND TO ESCHEW CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS.

21. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF AND THE
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SENSITIVITIES SURROUNDING THE FUTURE OF US/ROC REWATIONS, THE QUESTION OF HOW TO RESPOND TO FURTHER STEPS BY THE US TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC IS LIKELY TO BE HOTLY DEBATED. A SPLIT IS LIKELY TO OCCUR BETWEEN THOSE CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH CCK AND THOSE WHO WE BELIEVE HAVE SOUGHT A MORE FORCEFUL RESPONSE TO US ACTIONS. AS A RESULT, WE WOULD EXPECT GROC RESPONSES TO US MOVES TOWARD NORMALIZATION COULD WELL BE SOMEWHAT MORE INTEMPERATE THAN UNDER CCK, WHICH COULD IN TURN LEAD TO A HEIGHTENED DEGREE OF UNEASINESS AMONG THE LOCAL POPULACE AS WELL AS TO MORE OPEN EXPRESSION OF ANTI-AMERICANISM.

22. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE PREDOMINANTLY ANTI-COMMUNIST (AND ESPECIALLY ANTI-PRC) BIAS IN THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP, WE CAN SEE NO OPTION OPEN TO IT BUT TO ACCEPT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE DEVELOPMED BETWEEN THE US AND THE PRC. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRC, SEEKNG A "SOVIET OPTION," OR DECLARING AN INDEPENDENT STATUS FOR TAIWAN--ALL WOULD BE ANATHEMA TO THE MAJORITY OF THE OLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND WOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE ASSUMPTION OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4.

23. SO LONG AS THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP IS ABLE AND WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A MIDDLE GROUND ON THE ABOVE AND OTHER ISSUES, AND ASSUMING THAT NO SERIOUSLY DESTABILIZING OUTSIDE FACTORS INTER-VENE, THE ROC WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF STABILITY, ALTHOUGH PROGRESS IN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC AREAS IS LIKELY TO BE GREATLY REDUCED. HOWEVER, AS SOON AS THE ABILITY TO REACH COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS DISAPPEARS, EITHER BECAUSE ONE FACTION BELIEVES IT CAN DECISIVELY GAIN THE UPPER HAND OR BECAUSE OF SEVERE SPLITS IN OPINION, THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP ARRANGEMENT WILL BEGIN TO UNRAVEL AND A STRUGGLE FOR CONTROLLING POWER WILL ENSUE. THE ALMOST INEVITABLE RESULT OF SUCH A SITUATION WOULD BE THE EMERGENCY OF A NEW STRONG MAN WHO WILL MOST PROBABLY COME FROM THE MILITARY OR SECURITY APPARATUS, WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE--ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY THE BLESSING--OF THE KMT OLD GUARD.

24. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO IDENTIFY WHO THE NEW STRONG MAN WILL BE, OBVIOUS POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE WANG YUNG-SHU (3769/3057/2885), WHO AS HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU IS NUMBER ONE IN THE SECURITY APPARATUS; WANG SHENG, BECAUSE OF

HIS KEY ROLE IN THE GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT; OR ONE OF THE MEN WHO IS A SERVICE CINC, TGGH COMMANDER, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, OR MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AT THE TIME OF CCK'S DEATH.

25. CHIANG WEI-KUO (5592/4885/0948), SECOND SON OF PRESIDENT

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CHIANG AND COMMANDANT OF THE ARMED FORCES UNIVERSITY, IS ANOTHER POSSIBLE CANDIDATE BOTH BECAUSE HE CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE PART OF THE RULING FAMILY AND BECAUSE OF HIS BROAD CONTACTS IN THE MILITARY. WE ARE NOT CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT CHIANG WEI-KUO HAS THE QUALITIES NECESSARY TO BE A LEADER IN HIS OWN RIGHT; BUT HE COULD BE A FRONT MAN FOR A MILITARY GROUP, PERHAPS LED BY ONE OF THE POTENTIAL STRONGMEN MENTIONED ABOVE.

26. ALTHOUGHT SUCH MEN MIGHT HAVE THE POWER TO GOVERN TAIWAN IN A STABLE FASHION FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF 'LEGITIMACY' AND UNQUESTIONED AUTHORITY AS ACCRUED TO CCK AS THE GIMO'S HEIR AND THUS WOULD NOT BE FREE TO EXERCISE THE SAME BREADTH OF VISION, MODERATION, AND FLEXIBILITY THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED CCK'S LEADERSHIP.

EPILOGUE

27. IN THIS PAPER WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE MOST LIKELY EVENTS TO OCCUR SHOULD CCK DIE BEFORE 1978. ASSUMING CCK REMAINS AT THE HELM IN TAIAN THROUGH THE ELECTIONS OF 1978, WE BELIEVE HE IS LIKELY TO MAKE MOVES AT THAT TIME (OR SHORTLY THRE-AFTER) THAT WILL PREPARE THE WAY FOR THE DIFFUSION OF POWER OR THE ALTERATION OF THE POWER STRUCTURE AFTER HIS DEPARTURE--POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE TACIT DESIGNATION OF A SUCCESSOR. THESE POSSIBILITIES WILL BE DISCUSSED IN SEPARATE MESSAGES. UNGER

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Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: SECRET
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Subject: SPECULATIONS ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PART I, IF CHIANG CHING-KUO DIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE
TAGS: PINT, TW, (CHIANG KAI-SHEK)
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